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RELIGION, MORALITY, AND LAW

JOHN T. RICHARDSON, C.M.t

Less and less is the stigma of antiquarianism being attached to studies and scholars
who in increasing numbers are turning their
attention to the philosophical and religious
background of law. Religion, Morality, and
Law represents the third in a series of studies
emerging from the annual Conference on
Law in Society, edited by Arthur L. Harding, Professor of Law at Southern Methodist
University. The scholarly jurists whose views
are presented in these volumes have taken a
scientific and modern approach to many
fundamental problems in jurisprudence,
thereby filling a growing demand caused by
the long-standing disregard American law
schools and law journals have had of research in this area of jurisprudence. The
present volume differs from its predecessors
in the series in that religion and morality,
rather than the natural law, are viewed as
the basis of law.
This difference of emphasis is particularly
patent in the first essay, "Can There Be
Morality without Religion," in which Robert
E. Fitch disassociates natural law ethics
from either morality or religion, though
natural law has been found deeply bedded
in the finest moral and religious traditions
of the West since the days of St. Paul. In the
brief scope of his paper the author concentrates on the empirical aspects of his hypotheses that there can be no morality without religion, tracing through history the
*Reprinted with permission from 6 DE PAUL LAW
REvIEw 181 (1956).
tDean of the Graduate School, De Paul University.

failures of eighteenth century Enlightenment, English Utilitarianism, and secularized Protestantism. His arguments are clear
and incontestable. The case he presents
against humanism is not so concisely formulated. Instead of demonstrating the inadequacy of humanism as a sole basis of morality, the author pictures it as opposed to
religion, and consequently disregards the
great contributions Christian humanism has
made to a reasonable and realistic morality
through its philosophy, its art, and its science, the best of which have generally been
accepted as an integral part of our culture.
For a brief exposition of the AristotelianThomistic theory of universal order, reason,
and permanent values as the foundation of
both law and morality, Arthur Harding's
essay "Law Without Morality" is highly
commendable. The treatment is broad
enough to indicate the point of departure
and insufficiency of other theories that have
influenced modern legal concepts: the various forms of determinism which have undermined the psychology of human choice in
law and morality; the absolutist's jurisprudence of John Austin which, reminiscent of
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, ultimately identifies law with the will or aggregate commands of the sovereign; the pure
theory of law devised by Hans Kelsen, which
logically seeks a more inclusive norm of law
but is left wavering without a solid basis.
The ethical "right," essential to both law
and morality as a starting point, is equally
important as a norm and guide of legal development. Without moral values law floun-
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ders in its legislative formation, its effective sanctions, and its administration. The
dual role of law as the operation of the
eternal law in human society and as the
governance of the people by the people does
not present a dilemma for the author. It is
the only rational explanation of the source
and function of law and morality.
A problem much closer to the legal practitioner is discussed in Wilber G. Katz's
paper, "Christian Morality and Criminal
Law." The point at issue is immediately
narrowed down to the purpose of legal punishment according to classical Protestant
tradition, originally expressed in the writings of Luther and Calvin. Retribution, or
the exercise of justice, for a criminal act
freely chosen, is discounted as a basis for
punishment in as much as the author attributes to "realistic" Judeo-Christian tradition,
supported by dynamic psychology, an insight into human nature which recognizes
the relatively fixed character of youth that
renders personal responsibility inappropriate to the issue. To the extent that criminal
behavior is conditioned, responsibility is imposed upon the criminal with no fault of his
own, only the vicarious responsibility of
those determining his conduct. Rehabilitation emerges as the prime purpose of punishment, with the prevention of crime as a
necessary result. An indirect appeal is made
to the reader for support of, or at least sympathy with, a penal reform that will embody
the theories here expounded. Many will be
slow to answer the appeal, particularly those
who are less deterministic in their ideas of
human behavior and are more appalled at
the facility of delinquents and criminals to
blame others for their conduct. The evidence
presented from Protestant tradition is far
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from convincing; a stronger case can be
made for the author's theories on the basis
of behavioristic psychology.
Natural law has never found a secure
position within the framework of Protestant
theology. By theologians such as Karl Barth
it is rejected when the Christian is forced to
make the inevitable choice between Jesus
Christ and natural law. Ernst Troeltsch attributes to it an importance equal to the
doctrine of the Trinity. In his paper entitled
"Theological Analysis of Natural Law,"
Joseph D. Quillian, Jr., formulates a theory
of Christian Natural Law that is essentially
different from the pagan concepts introduced by Aristotle and the Stoic philosophers. This natural law is "completely converted." Since human reason is incapable
of knowing the essential nature of natural
law, basic natural precepts are matters of
faith rather than reason, part of divine revelation. This theory of natural law is in complete harmony with the author's concept of
the doctrine of grace, pointing, as it does,
to the benevolent sovereignty of God and
the responsibility of man. Natural law has,
however, lost its philosophical foundation;
it is no longer shared by all men; it is ultimately a religious law in the supernatural
order of grace.
Regardless of the lawyer's personal position in matters philosophical and religious,
he must eventually recognize the extent the
present status of law has been shaped by
the philosophy and religion of Western society. It is very likely that law will continue
to be influenced by these same factors. Objective studies along these lines, particularly
if they are as thought-provoking as the ones
reviewed here, contribute greatly, therefore,
to the legal science of this country.

